EXHIBIT(S) - F (Motion #003) Exhibit F - Mayfair Care Center records - Exhibit F - Mayfair Care Center records Redacted April 08, 2019 (2024)

Case

ZEPHRINE, JOSEPHINE v. PIERRE, VERONICA

Jun 16, 2016 |Sharon M.J |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |001426/2016

Case

SRR HOLDINGS, LLC v. STATEWIDE BROKERAGE SERVICES CORP.

Sep 18, 2023 |Peterson, Hon. Danielle M. |Tort-Other Professional Malpractice |Tort-Other Professional Malpractice |614983/2023

Case

JONES, GAIL v. F.A. GUTIERREZ-VARGAS

Case

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INS v. VALMOND, WILSON

Case

FERNANDEZ, NOE v. KOSCHITZKI, BRENDA et al

Oct 27, 2020 |Singer, Hon. Conrad D. |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |611898/2020

Case

SAINT-JOIE, PETION v. BLOOM, RICHARD

Apr 21, 2014 |Trial Judge DCM |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |005336/2013

Case

Shirley Winston v. Ari'S Car Care Llc

Aug 27, 2024 |Torts - Other (Premises - Trip & Fall) |Torts - Other (Premises - Trip & Fall) |615245/2024

Case

MITKISH, CHRISTINE v. MASSA, PATRICIA

Mar 23, 2012 |Mahon, Hon. Roy S. |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |015316/2011

Case

LOPEZ, ANGEL v. DELUX TAXI

Oct 07, 2014 |Trial Judge DCM |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |008678/2014

Ruling

CONSTANCE BRADY VS DOE 1, A PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |22STCV04425

Case Number: 22STCV04425 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: C Brady v. Doe 1, 22STCV04425 This action was filed on February 4, 2022. Trial is currently scheduled for November 18, 2024. There is a Motion to Consolidate this action with 3 later filed related actions set for hearing on June 3, 2025. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to Seal the Unredacted Declaration of Thomas B. Burtland and attached Exhibits and the Unredacted Version of Earle Merchant's Declaration in Connection with Plaintiffs' Joint Motion to Consolidate is DENIED without prejudice. Alternatively, the Court schedules this to be heard as a regularly noticed motion. Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal will be heard on Thursday, December 5, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. The Ex Parte Application will be DEEMED the Moving Papers. Opposition and Reply to be filed and served in accordance with the new hearing date. Moving Party to give notice. A trial continuance may be sought in Dept. SE-F.

Ruling

VERONICA GOMEZ, ET AL. VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Case Number: 23STCV11884 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 29 Gomez v. Casillas 23STCV11884 Motion to be Relieved as Counsel, filed by Plaintiffs Counsel Arnoldo Casillas Tentative The motion is denied without prejudice. Background On May 25, 2023, Veronica Gomez, individually and as successor of interest for the Estate of Mario Gallegos (Plaintiff) against County of Los Angeles (Defendant) assault & battery, wrongful death, and Civil Rights Violations under Civil Code section 52.1 causes of action arising from the death of Mario Gallegos at the hands of an inmate at Oos Angeles County Mens Central Jail on May 9, 2022. On July 26, 2024, Arnoldo Casillas (Counsel) filed a motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard The court may order that an attorney be changed or substituted at any time before or after judgment or final determination upon request by either client or attorney and after notice from one to the other. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 284(b).) An attorney is permitted to withdraw where conflicts between the attorney and client make it unreasonable to continue the representation. (See Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct 3-700(C)(1).) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) An application to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a)), MC-052 (Declaration) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.136(c)), and MC-053 (Proposed Order) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e)). Further, the requisite forms must be served on the client and all other parties who have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The court may delay effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) Discussion Counsel has filed the Notice, Declaration, and Order to be Relieved as Counsel. However, the Order is blank, and the Declaration fails to include the OSC re Dismissal set for May 22, 2025. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED without prejudice. Conclusion The motion to be relieved as counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

Ruling

CECILIA FLORES VS CITY OF HAWTHORNE

Aug 27, 2024 |22TRCV01394

Case Number: 22TRCV01394 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: P Motion for Summary Judgment The court considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. RULING Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. BACKGROUND On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff Cecilia Flores filed a complaint against Defendant City of Hawthorne, alleging a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property (Government Code section 835). The complaint alleges that on June 26, 2022, at the southeast corner of the intersection of El Segundo Boulevard and Manor Driver in the City of Hawthorne, Plaintiff tripped on a cracked, raised, damaged or uneven roadway, which was a dangerous condition. On May 29, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment. On August 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On August 22, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants Evidence · The following objections are OVERRULED: 2, 4 · The following objections are SUSTAINED: 1, lacks foundation; 3, legal conclusion. LEGAL AUTHORITY The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Id.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).) DISCUSSION Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the T-shaped depression Plaintiff alleges she fell on is trivial as a matter of law, and therefore not a dangerous condition; (2) the T-shaped depression is an open and obvious condition and thus, there is no duty to warn or remedy the condition; (3) Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition; and (4) Plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the claim presentation requirements under the Government Claims Act because the location and condition of the dangerous condition have changed after filing the lawsuit. 1. Is the Alleged Dangerous of Property Condition a Trivial Defect? Government Code section 835 states: Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. The term dangerous condition means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Gov. Code § 830(a).) A condition is not dangerous within the meaning of the statute unless it creates a hazard to those who foreseeably will use the property . . . with due care. Thus, even though it is foreseeable that persons may use public property without due care, a public entity may not be held liable for failing to take precautions to protect such persons. (Matthews v. City of Cerritos (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384.) The condition of the property involved should create a substantial risk of injury, for an undue burden would be placed upon public entities if they were responsible for the repair of all conditions creating any possibility of injury however remote that possibility might be. (Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 130, fn.5.) The concept that a condition must be dangerous to be actionable is codified in Government Code section 830.2 as the trivial defect doctrine. Under that section, a condition is not a dangerous condition&if the&court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circ*mstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. (Government Code section 830.2.) The trivial defect doctrine originated to shield public entities from liability where conditions on public property create a risk of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circ*mstances . . . no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 (quoting Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 27).) The trivial defect doctrine is not an affirmative defense. (Id.) It is an aspect of duty that a plaintiff must plead and prove. (Id.) In appropriate cases, the trial court may determine . . . whether a given walkway defect was trivial as a matter of law. (Id.) Where reasonable minds can reach only one conclusionthat there was no substantial risk of injurythe issue is a question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment. (Id. at 1104-05 (quoting Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 929).) If, however, the court determines that sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect presents a substantial risk of injury, the court may not conclude that the defect is trivial as a matter of law. (Id. at 1105.) In determining whether a given walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law, the court should not rely solely upon the size of the defectin this case, on the depth or height of the walkway depression or elevationalthough the defects size may be one of the most relevant factors to the courts decision. (Id. (quoting Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734) (emphasis in original).) The court should consider other circ*mstances which might have rendered the defect a dangerous condition at the time of the accident. (Id.) These other circ*mstances or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged edges in the area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material obscured a pedestrians view of the defect, the plaintiffs knowledge of the area, whether the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the time of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents. (Id.) In sum, [a] court should decide whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of the circ*mstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more dangerous than its size alone would suggest. (Id. (quoting Caloroso, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at 927) (alteration in original).) In making that determination, the court must undertake two essential steps: First, the court reviews evidence regarding type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors [bearing on whether the defect presented a substantial risk of injury]. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law. (Id.) Here, there is no dispute as to the defect in the roadway which Plaintiff asserts was unreasonably dangerous. It is depicted in the exhibits of both parties as a depression in the asphalt pavement of Manor Drive approximately ten feet from the west curbline of Manor drive and almost immediately adjacent to El Segundo Boulevard. (UMF 15.) The depression is roughly shaped like a T and is approximately 103 inches in length and varies between 20 and 30 1⁄2 inches wide. (Blanchette Dec. ¶ 7; Solomon Dec. ¶ 6.) The parties also agree that the maximum depth of the depression is approximately 1 3/8 inch. (UMF 15; PUMF 3.) Plaintiffs exhibits suggest that there is not a sharp drop off between the surrounding pavement and the defect; rather, the exhibits suggest that the depression is shallower at the edges than at the center. (Decl. Meissner, Exh. 6.) All of the photographs suggest that the depression is a different color from the surrounding pavement, a fact noticeable even from the satellite data used by Google Maps. (Decl. Meissner, Exh. 4.) Taken together, the court finds that, as to the first step in the analysis, that the defect is trivial as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the court notes that a depression is different in kind from a lifted section of concrete. The evidence shows that depression is scalloped rather than sharp and human experience suggests that a depression is less of a tripping hazard than a raised piece of concrete. To be sure, the height differential posed some risk of injury&[b]ut to constitute a dangerous condition, the height differential, and the area surrounding it, must have posed a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal. App. 5th at 110910.) The next step in the courts analysis is to determine whether there are any other conditions which, even though the defect is trivial, would make the defect dangerous. [A]dditional factors courts typically consider in assessing a sidewalk condition's triviality as a matter of law are: the nature and quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or cracks); whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect (for instance, an object, debris, or other substance); the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; whether the defect has caused other accidents; and plaintiff's familiarity with the area. (Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal. App. 5th 102, 115.) In support of the motion, Defendant presented evidence that Plaintiff would cross the same crosswalk at the subject intersection 4 to 5 times a week. (UMF 11.) (But see Stack, supra, 91 Cal. App. 5th at 119-120 (familiarity with the dangerous condition does not make it less dangerous.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the condition was not open and obvious. Plaintiffs expert opines that although T-shaped trench has an offset of 1 3/8 inches, it is not readily apparent to pedestrians that the T-shaped trench is depressed at all, let alone by almost an inch and a half, which (AMF No. 18, Solomon Decl., 9; Exh. 3.) The depth of the T shaped trench is made inconspicuous to pedestrians because of its similar shade of asphalt to the surrounding crosswalk. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff presents evidence that the City employees who went out to inspect the area after having been alerted of this incident by a proper government claim having been filed, testified that not even he initially noticed that the T-shaped trench was lower than the surrounding asphalt. (AMF No., 18, Krause Depo., 22: 19-21.) After reviewing the photographs and evidence submitted, the Court finds that, insofar as the distinction in color of the depression did not make the trivial defect any more dangerous, the condition was open and obvious. As to the other assertions made by Plaintiff, regarding sunlight and shadows as well as the oil, dirt and other debris on the ground there is no evidence of such factors. (Solomon Dec. ¶ 9.) Indeed, each of the photographs submitted by both sides show a depression in the middle of the roadway which is differently colored from the surrounding pavement and unobstructed in any way. Therefore, the court finds that there are no additional factors which increased the dangerousness of the asphalt defect. Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. As the court finds that the defect in the pavement is trivial as a matter of law and that issue is dispositive for the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court declines to address the other issues raised by defendant. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Ruling

SALCEDO vs PITA STREET, INC

Aug 28, 2024 |CVRI2103980

MOTION TO COMPEL TO RESPONDSALCEDO VS PITA STREET, TO PLAINTIFF'S DEMAND FORCVRI2103980INC PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS BYMERILYN SALCEDOTentative Ruling:GRANT

Ruling

Nuanmanee, et al. vs. Roseburg Forest Products, Co.

Aug 27, 2024 |23CV-0201676

NUANMANEE, ET AL. VS. ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS, CO.Case Number: 23CV-0201676This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. The Court notes that a minor’s compromisehas been approved and finalized for each of the named Plaintiffs. On May 23, 2024, the Court issued an Orderinforming Plaintiffs that the matter remains open as it has not been dismissed. An appearance is necessary ontoday’s calendar to provide the Court with an update regarding when the matter will be dismissed.

Ruling

Ramsour vs. Applewood Operating Company, LLC, et al.

Aug 29, 2024 |23CV-0202797

RAMSOUR VS. APPLEWOOD OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202797This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of mediation. On April 15, 2024, this Courtgranted Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue MSC and Trial Dates as the parties planned to proceed withmediation. No status report has been filed. Given that Defendants filed an answer to the FirstAmended Complaint on August 20, 2024, it appears this matter is now at issue and a new MSCand Trial Date can now be set. The case, originally filed 7/25/23, will be well beyond the Courtspreferred case disposition deadline. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discussstatus and trial setting.

Ruling

ANGELA TATE VS WOLFGANG PUCK ENTERPRISES, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Case Number: 22STCV23934 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 29 The hearing is continued for approximately 14 days pending potential transfer.Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

John Doe vs. Clovis Unified School District

Aug 27, 2024 |21CECG01008

Re: Doe v. Clovis Unified School Dist., et al. Superior Court Case No. 21CECG01008Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motion: Clovis Unified School District’s Motion to for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, for Summary AdjudicationTentative Ruling: To deny summary judgment. To grant summary adjudication of the fourth causeof action as to Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”), but to deny as to the third and fifthcauses of action.Explanation: Defendant Stacey Aprile sexually assaulted plaintiff when he was in the sixth gradeat Red Bank Elementary School within Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”) while Aprilewas acting as a sixth-grade student teacher in plaintiff’s classroom during the 1993-1994school year. As against CUSD, the First Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for(3) negligence; (4) failure to report suspected child abuse; and (5) negligent supervisionof a minor. CUSD now moves for summary judgment, or alternatively for summaryadjudication of each cause of action against it. Unconstitutionality of AB 218 In 2019 the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.2019, ch. 861, § 1) (AB 218), which provided a three-year window within which plaintiffswere permitted to bring childhood sexual assault claims against public entities that wouldotherwise be barred because of statutes of limitations or claim presentationrequirements. AB 218 eliminated claim presentation requirements for these claims. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).) CUSD contends that AB 218 constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds.Since the filing of CUSD’s motion, on July 31, 2024, the First District Court of Appeal issueda published opinion in Case Number A169314, rejecting this same argument advancedby West Contra Costa Unified School District. (West Contra Costa Unified School Districtv. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App., July 31, 2024, No. A169314) 2024 WL 3593932.)Accordingly, the motion will not be granted on this ground. Third Cause of Action for Negligence To prevail on a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision,plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant employer hired the subject employee, (2) thatthe subject employee was or became during the tenure of employment unfit to performhis or her job and or work, (3) that the defendant employer knew or should have knownthat the subject employee was at the time or became unfit to perform her job and thatthis unfitness created a risk to other people, (4) that the subject employee’s unfitnesscaused the plaintiff harm, and (5) that the defendant employer’s negligence in hiring,supervising, or retaining the subject employee was a substantial factor in causing theplaintiff's harm. (D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229;Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815.) The negligent hiring aspect of the claim may be difficult for plaintiff to establishgiven the unusual relationship between Aprile and CUSD, given that Aprile was assignedto work at Red Bank Elementary through the teaching credential program at Fresno StateUniversity, and plaintiff has presented no evidence that Aprile had ever engaged in anyabusive or inappropriate conduct prior to her two-month stint at Red Bank. (See UMF 15-17.) There is no evidence of any red flags prior to that point that would have put CUSDon notice. However, there is a triable issue on the question of negligent retention andsupervision aspect of the claim. A school district has an affirmative duty to take allreasonable steps to protect plaintiff from foreseeable harm. (Jennifer C. v. Clovis UnifiedSchool Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1328; J.H. v. Clovis Unified School Dist. (2010) 183Cal.App.4th 123, 141–142.) Gayle Peck observed Aprile inappropriately befriending students on and offcampus. (UMF 9, 39.) A parent alerted Peck that Aprile socialized with students offcampus (AUMF 10.) Peck confronted Aprile on at least two occasions to discussprofessionalism and warn Aprile against befriending students, which she consideredinappropriate. (UMF 9, 13.) Although Peck felt strongly that Aprile’s student friendshipswere inappropriate, Peck never reported these incidents to the school principal. (UMF 14,39.) Multiple classmates, of plaintiff, Brad Paige and Marlene Fortney, testified Aprilewas constantly socializing and hanging out with students during recess and lunch,apparently every day. It was so common that it was somewhat uncomfortable for thesixth grade students, and they indicated that Aprile was primarily interested in plaintiff.Aprile was so often with plaintiff on campus during school hours that one student teasedthat plaintiff and Aprile were boyfriend/girlfriend. (See Evidence in Response to UMF 12.)While there is no direct evidence that this socializing was communicated to CUSD staff(other than what was observed by Peck), the description of the socializing indicates thatit was quite open and would be observable to numerous other CUSD staff. The open andrather apparent lack of boundaries would likely have been observable to Peck as wellas other CUSD staff. And one instance of alleged abuse took place during a school-sponsored trip toCamp Sonora, where Aprile gave plaintiff a role in a talent show where he was requiredto strip down into his underwear. (UMF 21.) Despite Aprile’s access to students, CUSD did not provide Aprile with mandatedreporter training. (UMF 17, 18.) CUSD never trained Aprile on the term “grooming” and toavoid close physical contact with students. (UMF 19, 20.) While the parties cite to no authority regarding a school’s supervisory responsibilityover a student teacher not directly employed by the school, there is enough evidencehere to raise a triable issue of fact. School administrators may be liable for their negligentsupervision of employees that results in sexual abuse. (Doe v. Lawndale ElementarySchool Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 136-137.) “Once a court determines a defendantowes a duty to a plaintiff, “the remaining liability questions—breach as well as factualand legal causation—are usually questions for the jury.” (Id. at pp. 126-237, quoting Brownv. USA Taekwaondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 228.) Whether defendant school district in facttook reasonable care to prevent abuse is a question of breach usually for the jury.” (Doev. Lawndale Elementary, supra; quoting Brown, supra, at pp. 230-231.) If the court determines that there exists a special relationship between the parties,the court must consult the factors described in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.(Id. at p. 127.) CUSD does not dispute that a special relationship exists, and that the Rowlandfactors must be applied (though in its moving papers CUSD did not address Rowland atall). “The Rowland factors are ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” ’ ” (Archbishop, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 673-674, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 613; see Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 434, 483 P.3d 159; Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 628, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656.) “In considering [the Rowland factors], we determine ‘not whether they support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.’ ” (Regents, at p. 629, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656; see Brown, at p. 221, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 434, 483 P.3d 159.) Thus, a court considers the Rowland factors “ ‘at a relatively broad level of factual generality.’ ” (Brown, at p. 221, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 434, 483 P.3d 159.)(Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 127.) “The Rowland factors fall into two categories. The first group involves foreseeability and the related concepts of certainty and the connection between plaintiff and defendant.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656; see Archbishop, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 674, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 613.) “ ‘The most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care ... is whether the injury in question was foreseeable.’ ” (Regents, at p. 629, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656; see Kesner v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1145, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 283, 384 P.3d 283; Dix v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 611, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 532.)(Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 131.) Foreseeability CUSD asserts that Aprile’s conduct was not foreseeable. However, as discussedabove, there was information about Aprile’s alleged conduct and lack of boundarieswith young sixth grade students, specifically as directed at plaintiff, that CUSD either knewabout or should have known about. This includes information about Aprile’s conductknown by Peck and observable by Peck and others in relation to Aprile’s closeattachment and socializing with students, and plaintiff in particular. “[S]chooladministrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees,even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee’s history ofcommitting, or propensity to commit, such abuse.” (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra,at p. 119; see also Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13.) “But the issue here is not whether it is foreseeable a particular adult will sexually abuse a student if left alone with the student. As the court recognized in United States Youth Soccer, and as subsequent cases confirmed, the issue is whether it is reasonably foreseeable that organizations or entities that provide services primarily or exclusively for children have employees who may sexually abuse a child if the organization fails to take reasonable measures to prevent the abuse. In any event, to the extent John R. suggests sexual abuse of students by school employees is not reasonably foreseeable, it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's more recent holding in Hart that school personnel owe students a duty to take reasonable measures to protect them from foreseeable injury, including “injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault.” (Hart, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 871, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 270 P.3d 699.)(Id. at p. 131.) Here, the question of foreseeability that Aprile would sexually abuse a student isone that should be left for the jury. There is evidence of troubling conduct known to orobservable by CUSD personnel that warranted further supervision, training and/orinvestigation. While there was apparently no conduct of a sexual nature known orobserved by CUSD personnel, a trier of fact could conclude that the abuse that occurredor followed was foreseeable. There were red flags in Aprile’s conduct with plaintiff andother students. And as plaintiff points out in the opposition, it is reasonably foreseeablethat if CUSD failed to take reasonable measures to prevent childhood sexual abuse of itsminor students enrolled at its schools its students will be injured because of sexual abuse. The degree of certainty plaintiff suffered injury Inasmuch as CUSD does not show that plaintiff was not sexually abused by Aprile,this factor does support a finding, for purposes of this motion, that plaintiff was sexuallyassaulted by Aprile and suffered injury as a result. Closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered The question is whether school administrators may be liable when they fail to takereasonable measures to identify and respond to signs of potential sexual abuse ofstudents by employees. “A school district that fails to reasonably supervise employeesand students increases the likelihood that an employee will sexually abuse a student.”(Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.) The court concludes that the foreseeability factors do not support an exceptionto the duty of care. Policy Factors “ ‘A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries ... where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost-internalization values of negligence liability.’ ” (Regents, at p. 631, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656; see Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1086-1087, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 404 P.3d 1196.)(Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) Moral blame “Parents place trust in school to supervise their children.” (J.H. v. Los AngelesUnified School Dist. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 123, 142, [“].) “In light of the disparity betweenschool administrators and minor students in knowledge and control over the schoolenvironment, and the trust parents place in schools to protect their children, schooladministrators who fail to prevent sexual abuse are not absolved of moral responsibilitysimply because they did not have “actual knowledge” an employee previouslyengaged in sexual misconduct. Nor should administrators ignore signs of grooming ormisconduct simply because someone untrained in the signs of sexual abuse perceivesthe conduct as “ambiguous.” Administrators who fail to notice, identify, and respond towarning signs that suggest an employee is sexually abusing or will sexually abuse astudent bear some moral responsibility for the abuse.” (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary,supra, at pp. 134–135.) Here, while there were not strong indicators of sexual abuse, there were warningsigns of lack of boundaries, including to the extent that plaintiff and Aprile were teasedthat they were boyfriend/girlfriend. This, according to Marlene Fortney, was based ontheir interactions hanging out together every day at lunch and recess, which should beobservable by CUSD staff. Given that CUSD had control over the school facilities where the alleged groomingbehavior occurred, the moral blame factor does not favor eliminating a duty of care. Policy of preventing future harm “Safeguarding children from sexual abuse—‘[o]ne of society's highest priorities’(Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066, 1078-1079, 60Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 929 P.2d 582)—weighs strongly in favor of imposing a duty on schooldistricts to take reasonable measures to identify and respond to potential misconduct,even before a district knows a specific employee has previously engaged in sexualmisconduct.” (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.) This same analysis favors a duty to take reasonable measures to identify andrespond to potential misconduct. CUSD does not address this factor. Burden CUSD does not address this factor, and plaintiff submits no evidence particularlydirected at this factor, such as whether CUSD already had in place policies to detectand prevent sexual abuse of students by teachers. (I.e., see Doe v. Lawndale Elementary,supra, at p. 137.) Certainly there would be some burden, perhaps at substantial cost. Butsince CUSD does not address this factor, and plaintiff submits no evidence specificallydirected at it, the burden factor does not weigh in favor of either party. Insurance As in Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, CUSD’s motion for summary judgment does notsubmit evidence regarding whether it is able to obtain insurance coverage in the futureto cover claims arising from sexual misconduct by its faculty and staff. Thus, as in Doe v.Lawndale Elementary, this factor should not weigh for or against defendant’s proposedlimitation. (Id. at p. 137.) This factor is addressed in the reply, but again, without supportingevidence. Accordingly, as in Doe v. Lawndale, the court finds that the Rowland factors donot weigh in favor of limiting CUSD’s duty to prevent sexual abuse in this case. Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Report Abuse Under Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (“CANRA”) CANRA requires a “mandated reporter,” which includes teachers and certain other school employees, “to make a report to a law enforcement agency or a county welfare department ‘whenever the mandated reporter, in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.’ ” (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 186, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 361 P.3d 319 (B.H.); see Pen. Code, § 11165.7.) Failure to make the required report is a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 11166, subd. (c).) In addition, an injured minor may bring a civil action where “ ‘a breach of the mandated reporter's duty to report child abuse’ ” causes the minor's injuries. (B.H., at p. 189, fn. 6, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 361 P.3d 319; accord, All Angels Preschool/Daycare v. County of Merced (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 394, 405, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 349; see Alejo v. City of Alhambra (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 [“allegations [a] defendant failed to make the report required by the statute support[ ]” a cause of action “under the doctrine of negligence per se”], disapproved on another ground in B.H., at p. 1289, fn. 6, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 361 P.3d 319.)(Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.) “… CANRA employs an objective standard for evaluating the reasonableness ofa mandated reporter's suspicion.” (Ibid.; Pen. Code, § 11166, subd. (a)(1).) Whethermandated reporters like teachers and school employees have a reasonable suspicion ofabuse depends on the facts actually known to them, not what they should have knownhad they been paying attention. (Id. at p. 139.) Here, it was known by Peck that Aprile was befriending students on campus andsocialized with students at the mall, which resulted in two discussions warning Aprile notto socialize with students, which Peck found inappropriate. (AMF 9, 10, 13, 14.) Peck evenchanged her ground rules for student teachers after she learned that Aprile, to directstudent teachers that they were not allowed to leave campus with students. (UMF 86.) However, this is not enough to provide an objectively reasonable suspicion thatabuse was occurring. Peck testified that she did not suspect any child abuse of plaintiffand that CUSD did not have any notice of any such abuse. (UMF 23.) Plaintiff admittedthat he does not believe that anyone knew of the alleged abuse and that he did not tellanyone that the abuse occurred. (UMF 27.) While there were some red flags thatwarranted further supervision, training and follow-up investigation, the information knownto Peck and/or CUSD was not enough to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of childabuse so as to trigger the mandatory reporting requirement. The court is inclined to grantthe motion for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action. Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision of Minor CUSD argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for negligent supervision,hiring and retention of an employee. However, the “special relationship between publicschool personnel and students imposes on the District’s administrative and supervisoryemployees a duty of reasonable care to protect a student from foreseeable dangers,including those from other school employees. . . .” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union HighSchool District (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868-869.) CUSD had a duty to protect plaintiff fromforeseeable dangers, including those posed by Aprile. Foreseeable dangers are not onlythose specifically foreseeable in this particular case but the general category of dangers,i.e. childhood sexual abuse at a school. (See Doe v. Lawndale Elementary, supra.) Theevidence discussed above is sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as towhether plaintiff was adequately supervised. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 8/22/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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